A crash involving two London North Eastern Railway (LNER) trains happened due to a driver struggling to use onboard software, an investigation has found.

An Azuma train ran into the back of another train near Neville Hill depot, Leeds, on November 13 last year, the Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB) said.

The driver of the Azuma train had 39 years of experience working on the railway but it was only the third time he had operated an Azuma unaccompanied.

The RAIB said the collision occurred because he was focused on restarting an onboard system.

He “unintentionally” accelerated to 15mph, causing him to crash into the back of the leading train, which was travelling at 5mph.

Neither train was in passenger service and no-one was injured, but the incident caused both trains to crumple at the collision points, and the Azuma came off the tracks.

The RAIB found that the Azuma driver had been unable to set up the train management system because “ambiguous documentation” from manufacturer Hitachi led to LNER “misunderstanding the required process” when it developed its driving training programme.

It also said that the train firm failed to recognise he needed more training than his peers.

He had only driven trains for a period of two months in the two years before the accident due to health, personal and operational reasons.

Investigators made five safety recommendations, including for LNER to correct its understanding of Azuma software, and for Hitachi to reassess the design of the train against crashworthiness requirements.

The Azuma trains now operate many express services between West Yorkshire and London, with one operating a service into Bradford Forster Square for the the first time earlier this year.

Report summary

The report reads: "At 21:41 hrs on 13 November 2019, an empty LNER Intercity Express Train, approaching the maintenance depot at Neville Hill in Leeds, caught up and collided with the rear of a LNER High Speed Train moving into the depot. The leading train was travelling at around 5 mph (8 km/h) and the colliding train at around 15 mph (24 km/h). No one was injured in the accident, but the trailing bogie of the second and third vehicles and the trailing wheelset of the fourth vehicle of the Intercity Express Train derailed to the right, by up to 1.25 metres.

"The collision occurred because the driver of the Intercity Express Train was focused on reinstating an on-board system which he had recently isolated, instead of focusing on the driving task. This was exacerbated by him unintentionally commanding too much acceleration due to his lack of familiarity with the train.

"The driver had isolated the on-board system at Leeds station because he had been unable to correctly set up the train management system. He had been unable to do this because ambiguous documentation from Hitachi, the train manufacturer, had led to LNER misunderstanding the required process for setting up the train management system when developing the content of its driver training programme.

"The driver’s lack of adequate familiarity with the train probably arose because LNER had not recognised that his training needs were greater than for his peers.

"The derailment occurred because the design of the Intercity Express Train is susceptible to derailment in low speed collisions. This susceptibility is related to the use of high-strength couplers with large freedoms of movement in pitch and yaw. These features were part of the train’s design. However, the impact of these features on the train’s resistance to derailment and lateral displacement in low speed collisions, was not considered by the train’s designers.

"The crashworthiness standard used to design the Intercity Express Train did not specifically require consideration of the likelihood of derailment during collisions at lower than the 22.5 mph (36 km/h) specified design speed, nor did it include specific criteria for assessing the derailment performance. As such, the assessment and validation of the design did not identify any issues with these design features."

Recommendations

RAIB has made five recommendations. Two recommendations are addressed to LNER and relate to correcting its understanding of the setup of the train management system and ensuring that the documentation provided by Hitachi has not led to any other safety issues. The other recommendations relate to:

Hitachi to revisit the assessment of the design of the Intercity Express Train against the requirements of the crashworthiness standard

LNER to assess the risk of a derailment of an Intercity Express Train involved in a low speed collision

RSSB to consider whether it is appropriate for the crashworthiness standard to be modified.